Breaking the Deadlock Electoral Reforms for a Fresh Electoral Process 2

Political parties are emanating various manipulative tactics and sordid reasons in order to avoid the responsibility of enacting the 20 A: they all equivocally feel somewhat it has been forced onto them to swallow the bitter pill by the President Maithripala Srisena. Present situation is that all the minority parties except Muslim Congress has come into terms how to cope with the new formula that has been spread in media as basic for final formulation. As a result of this development main political parties SLFP and UNP emanating various tactics to impasse the progress of 20 A to the parliamentary table.  What are the tactics these two main parties using to avoid the enacting 20 A.

The SLFP the at least the desperate section of it is trying to table as many as three no confidence motions in a parliament that about to be dissolved after 20 A has been inducted in parliament. Therefore it is a very conspicuous delaying tactic of both schedules, than anything else considering the fact that they are quite intelligent enough not to imagine that people can be fooled by these no confidence motions after a decade of misrule that prompted the civic societies to rise against the those rulers. Hence it is obvious that the SLFP too are against the electoral reforms. Why?

The UNP is though somewhat open, in its stance, many of its activities are with hidden agenda of dissolving the parliament before taking up the 20 A and so it can permanently abandon the reforms, being sure of returning to ruling party status in the present context of political situation, and can claim that the people accepted their stance “no for electoral reforms” in the post-election scenario. Therefore it is not too bizarre, for their stance against the election commissioner’s recommendation of increasing number of seats in the parliament to 240 to 255, but are willing to accept 230 or 235. Why?

The cabinet of Ministers fancies that, with a slightest increase, a mixed electoral process that has been put forward mathematically can’t be implemented and has to stick on to the present process and that slightest increase will enhance their victory through that present system as well, a double ploy to politically negate the electoral reforms. Central Bank Bond issue also can be linked to this political maneuvering of dissolving the parliament early, being in 20 years power drought, desperate not to lose that opportunity so quickly, by bringing in new formula that cannot guarantee the retaining of power subsequent elections. Such thinking is only a myth and not the 20 A cannot be a myth as claimed by UNP Leader of House again.

Some members are opposing the floating (un-finalized) number of seats for parliament, perhaps quite correctly in the proposed electoral process. How a fluctuating number can be accommodated into a draft bill, and what is the range of such fluctuation. It should be somebody’s witty arrangement to derail the entire process, casting doubts on the Honourable legislators.   

If you have the will to enact an effective process it is easy and there will not be a delay to produce a draft bill, but both political parties show absolute reluctance to move forward with through various tactics. The following tabulation just illustrates how a manipulative deadlocks can be overcome in order to produce a draft 20 A.

Here are some technical proposals to overcome above stated strolling ploys

Parliamentary seats	FPPS Single and multi- elects	Representative Selects from Percentage Merit for looser political parties and groups
fixed	1 vote for single, 2 votes for double, 3votes for triple member constituencies **	on the basis of electoral- district  wise merit list of best percentage against total turnout for losers of each of 22 electoral district	Best national percentage merit against national turnout for losers *or best electorate national loser percentage wise
225	168	44	13
230	168	44	18
235	168	48	19
240	168	52	20
245	168	54	23
250	168	56	26
255	168	58	29
260	168	62	30

The count of loser votes only for accumulation from each of the polling divisions towards relevant electoral districts and for national level merit for every political party lost, based on total turnout for losers (FPPS winners votes are subtracted from the total turn out for each polling division and added) percentage, shall ensure representation for even the smaller and minority political parties, if they qualify the 5% in the electoral district level or National level. The district quota should always be of minimum of two or more, and the National quota are strictly filled by a merit system derived from the outcome of the effort put out by each political party towards contesting an election and attracting the voters towards their candidate in the same election, and it is only for this characteristic feature of democratic system, it has been applied for, and thus cannot be fluctuating in order to accommodate political parties particularly permanently in a true democratic electoral process.

If the present legislators demonstrate a will, shedding off all the prejudiced and preoccupied myths, and particularly rivalry for sustaining power, within Unity National Government with definite objective can produce a draft.   

1. * based on the each candidate lost but strictly of discretion of the party hierarchy

2. **Derived from the last General Election held entirely under the FPPS in 1977.

3. As a makeshift arrangement only, all lost candidates who failed to be elected of the  multi-member constituencies as well be drafted into the merit list, for the election immediately after the 20 A to satisfy the smaller political parties!